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COPYRIGHT LAW
Musical Style Piracy-Possible Methods of
Legal Protection for the Musical Stylist*
By JoHN L. YouNG**
With the advent of the radio and its widespread commercial use1 the problems of copyright regulation have increased
a thousandfold.
While the controversy has centered around the respective
rights of composers and authors in their dealings with broadcasters, there is yet another problem which has not up to this
date found its way into the courts, but is certain to do so in the
near future. This problem arises out of the fact that popular
and distinctive styles of playing modern music are being pirated
and copied from their originators by some of the lesser dance
band leaders.
In recent years the music furnished by dance orchestras
has been one of the most popular forms of radio entertainment
and as a result many of these programs have been commercialized
as an advertising medium with the sponsors paying fancy figures
to secure the services of an orchestra with a distinctive style of
playing.2 In several instances leaders of talent have originated
* The primary purpose of this paper is to assert that the musical
stylist does have property rights in his style and that such rights
should be protected against infringement. The writer herein makes
suggestions for revision of the copyright laws so as to recognize such
rights. There has also been pointed out a method of protection capable
of being administered by the courts in the absence of statutory protection. No cases nor text material appears on this precise point in so
far as the writer can ascertain.
* * A.B., Kentucky Wesleyan 1937; LL.B., University of Kentucky
1939; now practicing in Versailles, Kentucky.
2 See 30 Col. L. R. 1087 (1930) where it is stated that in 1929 advertisers spent $40,000,000.00 to reach a public listening to 12,000,000
receiving sets.

.

.

. Of course, this figure has been tremendously

increased
in the past nine years.
2
Warng v. WDAS Broadcasting Co., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631,
633 (1937). "Waring entered into a contract with the Ford Motor Co.
to broadcast on one night of each week for the sum of $13,500.00 for
each performance." This is only one example of the amount of money
involved in securing contracts for the broadcasting services of a
popular dance band. Other well-known orchestra leaders command
prices of similar magnitude for the services of their musicians as
radio entertainers.
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a style distinctive enough to create a great public demand for
their orchestra. Because of the public's liking for such a
distinctive musical creation the leader has become able to demand his own price for his band's services as an advertising
medium.
Upon finding that the public likes a particular style as
originated by an ingenious musician other musicians have
organized bands and have imitated, to a greater or lesser
degree, the style of the originator. There is no denying the
fact that such an imitation is a capitalization on another's
intellectual and artistic efforts. This state of affairs in the
entertainment world creates our problem.
As has been previously stated, there has been no case
arising out of this situation, but this fact is explainable upon
several grounds.
In the first place, the imitators have not as yet risen to the
popularity of the imitated, nor have they perfected the style
to such a degree that they can compete for the same contracts
with the imitated. Nevertheless, a case can easily be conceived
where such would not be the facts, and then if the pirate should
be awarded the contract for less money after a disagreement
between the originator and the sponsor over the price to be
paid, the originator would surely seek to protect his property
rights from infringement by the pirate.
A second ground of explanation for the fact that no case
of musical style infringement has been litigated is the status of
our present copyright laws. Today our Copyright Act does not
provide a method of registration for the copyrighting of "styles
of rendering music" as such, but there is in existence a method
of registration which approaches the present need only to the
point of allowing copyright to "arrangements" of musical numbers. Of course, each number played by the orchestra in its
peculiar style could be registered-for copyright because a style
is produced by the practice of reducing each musical number to
a particular arrangement, but the practical objections are too
numerous to permit such a procedure. Practically speaking, it
would be impossible to make a written copy for copyright registration purposes of each and every musical composition played
by an orchestra.
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Therefore, it is very likely that the musical stylists have
taken it for granted that they have no legal method of protecting
their genius as expressed in their music.
In order to formulate effectively a plan whereby protection
would be afforded such composers it seems necessary to draw
analogies from three closely allied fields of the law. These
fields are, namely: (a) Copyright, (b) Unfair Competition and
(c) Trade-Mark.
While copyright laws are promulgated chiefly for the
protection of artists, and unfair competition and trade-mark
laws for the protection of business men, the recent merger of
the arts with business, in the matter of broadcasting, affords
sufficient cause for bringing principles of unfair competition and
trade-mark law into copyright law.
The present Copyright Act and all amendments thereto
spring from the Constitution which gives Congress the power,
"To promote the progress of science and the useful arts by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
rights to their respective writings and discoveries." 3 By
judicial construction this grant has been extended to give Congress the power to allow copyright for many things which do
not "promote the progress of science and the useful arts" in
the strict sense, but such a construction does protect the creative
efforts of those who, by their genius, supply the people with
creations which are greatly in demand and which do serve a
useful purpose.
It has been settled for years that a musical composition is
a "writing" within the meaning of the Constitution, and as
far back as the Copyright Act of 18314 musical compositions
were specifically named as copyrightable subjects. It has been
consistently held that copyright is not confined to musical
compositions that are absolutely original, but applies to any
substantially new adaptation or arrangement of an old piece. 5
In Schuberth v. ShawO the court said, "In all such cases
(of copyright) the test of originality is applied to that which
3 Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4Act February 3, 1831 (4 Stat. 436, c. 16, sec. 1).
bAtwill v. Ferrett, 2 Fed. Cas. No. 640 (C.C. S. D. N. Y. 1846);
Reed v. Carusi, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,642 (C.C. D. Md. 1845).
621 Fed. Cas. No. 12,482 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1879).
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represents the labor or skill of the person claiming the
copyright."
If an orchestra stylist should take each new piece, copyrighted or uncopyrighted, and re-arrange the orchestration so
as to conform to his distinctive style he would undoubtedly be.
able to secure a copyright on his arrangement or orchestration
of it. Still he has the problem of having to register each
orchestration with the Librarian of Congress (as agent of the
Copyright Office under the Copyright Acts) before he can
be fully protected. Certainly he has shown originality by his
own labor and skill in making such arrangements, and under
the test set down above 7 he could surely secure copyright of
each of the orchestrations.
Even this method of protection is grossly inadequate because
in most instances the popularity of the particular piece of music
will have waned before copyright could be granted. Another
objection to such a method lies in the fact that most modern
musical compositions are so short-lived that any delay in
securing copyright automatically does away with the advantage
of securing a copyright. By the time the copyright is secured the
piece has become virtually obsolete and no one has any desire
to copy the style as applied to that particular piece.
One can easily see that such a method of protecting a style
would be no protection at all for the stylist of popular musical
tunes.
Leaving the statutory inadequacies and going to a consideration of common-law copyright we find that musical compositions are the subject of exclusive common-law property
rights.
In the case of Stern, et al. v. Carl Laemmle Music Co.8 it
was held that until publication a composer has a property right
at common-law in an original musical composition which equity
will protect, and such right does not depend on the copyright
laws of the United States.9 The injection of the phrase, "until
"21 Fed. Cas. No. 12,482 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1879).
s133 N. Y. Supp. 1082 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1911).
. See also the opinion in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Co., 327 Pa.
433, 194 AtI. 631 (1937) at p. 634 where it is held that, " ... at commonlaw, rights in a literary or artistic work were recognized on substantially the same basis as title to other property. Such rights antedated the
-original Copyright Act of 8 Anne c. 19, and, while it has been uniformly
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publication," into the holding does not affect the analogy because in the case of the stylist such writing of arrangements for
use by his musicians as is necessary to produce the distinctive
style would not be a publication, nor would public performance
(broadcasting or playing before audiences) constitute a
dedication to the public.1 0
Therefore, it would seem that although a musician has been
playing music of distinction for several years he might still bring
suit for piracy and predicate such suit upon his common-law
rights in his origination of the style as a style and not upon his
rights in a series of arrangements of musical compositions.
To better illustrate our problem let us take a few actual
examples of style piracy in music as we hear it played today.
A few years ago there was originated the idea of "singing song
titles." The primary feature of the idea was to announce each
musical number by singing the title to an appropriate orchestral
accompaniment or "run" and then to go directly into the playing
of the number in a very distinctive style.
This device of "singing song titles" has been utilized by
at least two very prominent orchestra leaders who use it for
purposes of identifying themselves over the air. The two most
prominent users of "singing song titles" are Kay Kyser and
Sammy Kaye. Without intimating which leader is the imitator,
it is sufficient to state that there is a great similarity in the
styles of these two orchestras. In fact, the styles are so similar
that even most musicians are deceived by the respective broadcasts of these two orchestras unless frequent station announcements are made as to their identity.
Neither of these bands has been able (nor have they tried,
so far as the writer has been able to ascertain) to secure copyright of their styles. This style of music is very popular with
held that the rights given by the Act supersede those of the common-law
so far as the Act applies" (Italics added).
(Citing Donaldsons v.
Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774); Wheaton v. Peters,
8 Pet. 591, 8 L. ed. 1055 (U. S. 1834); and Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S.
82, 19 Sup. Ct. 606, 43 L. ed. 904 (1899) ". . the common-law rights in
regard to any field, of literary or artistic production which does not fall
within the purview of the copyright statute are not affected thereby."
(Italics added.)
"Thomas v. Lennon, 14 Fed. 849 (Cir. Ct., Dist. Mass. 1883). See
especially, Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S.424 (1911). Rules as to publica.
tion of musical compositions follow the analogies of dramatic compositions. See also, 13 Corpus Juris p. 986, section 52(5).
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the public and as a result both leaders have profited. However,
it seems that the originator should have some means of protecting
himself and securing to himself, to the exclusion of all others,
the right to play that particular style of music which was
born of his intellectual and artistic efforts.
In the same category of musical stylists who use '"singing
song titles" we may also place Blue Barron, but Barron has
not perfected the style to a degree sufficient to be classed as a
competitor of Kyser and Kaye.
Further illustrating piracy of musical style is the imitation
of Shep Fields' "Rippling Rhythm" music. There are several
lesser musicians who have copied this manner of playing to
some degree, but the most notable example is the leader who
uses the same style and announces it as the "Babbling Brook"
melody. Both leaders capitalize on the musical effect produced
which so closely resembles in sound the rippling of a stream.
There would seem to be some doubt as to whether Fields
could prevent the use of "Babbling Brook" as a style identification even if he has registered "Rippling Rhythm" as a trademark because the imitator is not seeking to pass off his music
as that of Fields. 1 There yet remains the fact that the imitator
is capitalizing on Fields' originality.
Whether the imitator's piracy will amount to "conduct
tending to pass off one man's merchandise as that of his own' '12
will depend upon what interpretation the court will give to the
phrase, "passing off." If "passing off" is to mean that the
public must be deceived into thinking that the music is that of
ields then there would be no unfair competition, but if the more
liberal interpretation is given, and it is held that the phrase
means an advertiser will be willing to accept the imitation as
being just as good as Fields' and will give the contract to the
imitator rather than to Fields because the imitator is cheaper,
then the doctrine of unfair competition should protect Fields.
The more liberal interpretation has been adopted in one in3
stance.'
n Sweet Sixteen Shops of Detroit v. Goodman, et al., 219 N. W. 599
(Mich. 1928).
1Autoline Oil Co. v. Refining Co., 3 Fed. (2d) 457 (D. C. Md. 1924).
Syllabus.
2 International News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U. S.
215, 39 Sup. Ct. 68 (1918).
See also 51 Harv. L. Rev. 171, 172; and 33
Mich. L. Rev. 321, 331.
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The protection of the trade-mark "Rippling Rhythm"
would be merely incidental to protection of the style itself since
the style is the merchandise in this analogy and the trade-mark
serves only to distinguish the style from other music and to
give publicity to it.
Therefore, if a means can be found to protect the style, the
trade-mark would be automatically protected. This automatic
protection arises from common-law trade-mark rights since
redress accorded in trade-mark cases is based on the party's
right to be protected in the good will of his trade or business. 14
Other examples of similarity in musical styles and
interpretations in which there is identity of varying degrees
may be given. Eddie Duchin, the piano stylist, has a competitor in the person of Henry King, also a piano stylist.
Whether or not there is piracy here the writer is not prepared
to say, nor is there any opinion expressed as to the similarity
of style existent in the music of Jan Garber and his contemporary, Guy Lombardo. An example of combination of styles
is George Hamilton's "Music Box" music. This popular
stylist uses the Fields style with introductions in the Duchin
manner.
A search through the authorities revealed that the nearest
approach to a case of the type anticipated by this article is the
case of Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc.i5 This
case, decided in October of 1937, by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania involved the right of an orchestra leader to
enjoin the broadcast of his interpretations of musical numbers
from unlicensed phonograph records.
The injunction was
granted with the whole court of seven judges assenting. There
was a dissent as to part of the rationale by Justice Maxey, 16
but he concurred in the result.
It is quite evident that any future cases arising under an
asserted right of an orchestra leader to a particular style of
music will be based on the reasoning and holding of the majority
in this Pennsylvania case.
The majority recognizes the novelty of the problem and
states that it has never been presented to an English or American
3 Hanover ,Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S 403, 404 (1916).
327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
16194 Atl. at p. 642.
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Court.17 Justice iMaxey in his separate opinion' 8 says it is
not a novel case, fundamentally, but "exhibits an invasion of
an ancient right . . the right of privacy."
It is quite probable that Justice Maxey is right and the
particular case before the court did involve the right of privacy
of the plaintiff. Even conceding that the case could have
rightly been decided solely on the right of privacy,' 9 the right
of privacy will not be an answer to a case of piracy of style
brought by one musical stylist or orchestra leader against a
pirating competitor.
A careful study of the Waring case reveals that the court
has in mind most of the difficulties standing in the way of a
solution to the contemplated problem, in the absence of special
Congressional action bringing the situation within the Copyright Act.
The plaintiff in the Waring case admitted that he was not
protected under the existing copyright laws, but maintained that
he had valuable common-law property rights which should be
protected by equity. 20 Upon granting the requested relief the
court stated that although the plaintiff did not in precise terms
charge unfair competition he had alleged sufficient facts to
enable the court to grant injunctive relief on the grounds of
unfair competition.
In arriving at its conclusion the court considered three
questions:
"(1)

Have performers ...

in this case, an orchestra . . . any enforceable property rights in their artistic interpretations of the work

of a composer?
"(2) If so, to what extent can such rights be reserved at the time of

what the law designates a 'publication'?
"(3) As ancillary to such rights, under what circumstances can performers be afforded equitable relief on the ground of unfair competition?"
17 Wd.p. 632-Justice Stern.

18IW. p.642.
"'Several grounds for the decision in the Waring case have been
suggested, one of which is that there was involved an equitable
servitude on a chattel, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 172 (1937); For comments
on the Waring case see: 9 Air Law Rev. 99, 102 (1938); 42 Dickinson L.
Rev. 88 (1938); 26 Georgetown L. Rev. 504 (1938); 6 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 237 (1938); 51 Harv. L. Rev. 171 (1937); 23 Wash. U. L. Q. 283
(1938); 24 Va.L. Rev.333 (1938).
"194 Atl. 631 (cited in footnote 15 supra) at p. 638 of the opinion.
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The court answers the first question in the affirmative and
in doing so goes back into the common-law of copyright before
the first English copyright act of 8 Anne c. 19. From there it
works its way through analogies drawn from copyrightable
22
21
arrangements of operatic scores, reports of a public speech,
translation or dramatization of a novel 2 3 up to the present day
and concludes that a performer who contributes something of an
intellectual or artistic value to a musical composition has thereby
acquired property rights which do not over-lap those of the
author or composer of the work. The court then holds that the
interpretation is an independent work of art.
Having concluded that an interpretation gives a property
right, the court decided that there had not 'been a "publication"
as construed in law. To support this holding there was cited
McCarthy and Fisherv. White,24 Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.,25 and other cases which hold that in order to be a
"publication" which destroys property rights there must be
"such a dissemination of the work of art itself among the public
as to justify the belief that it took place with the intention of
rendering such work common property." 2 6
The third and final question is answered by International
News Service v. Associated Press,27 a case involving news
gathered at great expense by Associated Press and pirated by its
competitor. The court in that case granted an injunction not on
the basis of any absolute property in news as such, but on the
basis of unfair competition.
The court in tble Waring case quoted this phrase verbatim
from the Associated Press case,
"Obviously, the question of what is unfair competition in business
must be determined with particular
reference to the character and cir'
cumstancees of the business."2
2,Wood v. Boosey, 2 L. R. Q. B. 340 (1868).
'Walton v. Lane, (1900) A. C. 539.
23 Fleron v. Lackaye, 14 N. Y. Supp. 292 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
%259 Fed. 364 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1919). Playing of a musical composition is not a publication.
218 Fed. Supp. 358 (D. 0. Mass. 1934). Performance over the radio
Is not a publication.
"American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284 (1907)
quotes the test as set forth on p. 92 of Slater on the Law of Copyright
and Trade-larks.
248 U. S. 215 (1918).
28194 At. (Pa.) 631 at p. 639.
(Italics added.)
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If we follow the court's test as laid down above in the Associated Press case as to what is to be considered in determining
unfair competition we can easily see that any imitator of a distinctive style of music is engaging in unfair competition with the
originator in the "business" of musical entertainment.
The only possible justification for such conduct would be
that the unfair competitor did not offek his "goods" for sale in
the same market against the originator. This possibility of a
defense becomes obviated when it is proved that both styles of
music have been broadcast over an all-inclusive radio network or
even by proof of broadcasting over a single powerful radio station reaching different parts of the country.
Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented in the Associated Press case
on the ground that the gathering of news was a business involving
a complexity of public and private interests and that the court
sbould not create a new private right when such right, if created,
might work serious injury to the general public. 29 However,
Mr. Justice Brandeis in concluding his dissent admitted that
even in cases of news gathering, which is affected with a public
interest, there should be some remedy for one who has put forth
time, money, and intellectual effort in creating something new.30
In defense of his position Mr. Justice Brandeis seizes upon
tble age-old excuse of courts of equity and says,
"The courts are ill-equipped to make the investigation which
should precede a determination of the limitations which should be set
upon any property right in news or of the circumstances under which
news gathered by a private agency should be deemed affected with a
public interest. Courts would be powerless to prescribe the detailed
regulations essential to full enjoyment of the rights conferred or to
introduce the machinery required for enforcement of such regulations.
Considerations such as these should lead us to decline to establish a
new rule of law in the effort to redress a newly-disclosed wrong,
although the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear.""

While it is agreed on all sides that Mr. Justice Brandeis is
right in saying the legislature should be the body to give such
property rights and as one writer puts it, "his (Mr. Justice
Brandeis') progressivism needs no footnote reference," 32- still
2 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215,
262 (1918).
30International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215,
267 (1918). (".

.

. the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear.")

1Id. p. 267. (Italics added.)
3Fathchild, "STATUTOry UNFA n Co i'rrrnoN" p. 25. (Reprinted

from Missouri L. Rev., Vol. I, No. I, January, 1936.)
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he seems to have based his dissent in the Associated Press case
upon a very poor reason.
It is not argued that the legislature is less able to cope with
the situation than are the courts, but it is argued that in the
absence of such a right being given by the legislature the courts
should intervene upon general equitable principles and afford
protection to valuable property rights. It is also urged that the
courts have adequate machinery to enforce such rights after the
rights have been recognized.
As an illustration of the effectiveness of such machinery it
is only necessary to cite a case in which it was used to good
advantage.
In Schubert&v. Shaw3 3 there was a suit for infringement of
rights in an arrangement for the "Mlaneola Waltzes." The court,
after taldng testimony made a preliminary order appointing two
musicians as experts to report, "Whether the 'Mlaneola Waltz',
published by complainants, is musically different from the Waldteufel composition, in what the difference consisted, and whether
complainants' publication is an original musical composition
representing any muscal authorship.' 34
These experts, appointed by the court, reported as follows:
"While we do not consider the publication an original composition,
with the exception of the harmony in the last three bars of the introduction, we regard it as an original arrangement, and the work of a
practical harmonist and musician."

The court held that the complainants' publication was a substantially new adaptation of an old piece which might be copyrighted and that an injunction should be granted.
The above case demonstrates a method by which courts could
conveniently determine whether a style l1as been pirated or is
original. Moreover, it suggests a method by which a protective
provision in a copyright amendment for musical styles could be
enforced.
Since musical styles or interpretations are not protected by
the copyright laws of the United States the matter of amendment
of the laws so as to protect such property would seem, at first
thought, to be a rather simple procedure, but a mere insertion of
3121 Fed. Cas. No. 12,482 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1879).
1IId., p. 739.
321 Fed. Cas. No. 12,482 at p. 739 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1879).
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the subject "musical styles" or "personal interpretations of
music" into see. 5 of 17 U. S. C. A. 36 would not give adequate
protection, since there is no provision for registration of such
37

property.

The addition of "musical styles" to our present copyright
act would require revision of sections 9 to 12, inclusive, of 17
U. S. C. A. with a specific provision in section 11 allowing the
deposit of phonograph recordings 38 of samples of the "musical
style" or "personal interpretation" sought to be copyrighted.
Having once amended our copyright laws to allow copyright
of musical styles it would be a mere matter of form to dispose
of any infringement proceedings. This could be accomplished
by the appointment of a Commissioner of Musical Copyright or
an examiner (as is done in the Patent Office) who would be a
musical expert.39 This musical expert would be able to determine whether there was an attempted piracy of style. This same
examiner could adjudicate the rights of stylist litigants by an
analysis of the recorded copyright samples, together with
recorded samples of music played by the alleged pirate.
In concluding it may be stated that even though the problem
discussed above has not yet troubled the minds of jurists in a
case demanding decision on the exact point, it will be only a very
few years at the latest until they will be required to decide.
Protection for this group of artists and composers may best
be provided through legislation. This legislation could well
16If "musical styles" or "personal interpretations of music" were
to be added to the list of copyrightable subjects, it would be classified
as "see. 5" classification, "(n)" in 17 U. S. C. A.
37"Fred Waring, in 1935, made application to the Register of Copyrights for a copyright on 'the personal interpretation by Fred Waring,
of the musical composition 'Lullaby of Broadway.' The application was
rejected, the Register saying, inter alia: There is not and never has
been any provision in the Act for the protection of an artist's personal
interpretation of a musical work not expressible by musical notation
in the form of legible copies, although the subject hab been extensively
discussed both here and abroad . .

."

(Italics added.)

See Waring v.

WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 194 Atl. 631 (1937) n. 2, p. 633 at
p. 634.
"It is submitted that phonograph recordings as samples of the
style would be the most satisfactory means of registering the "style"
for copyright and in order to facilitate hearing on infringement claims
the applicant should be required to file a recording of three numbers,
varying in tempo and type of music. A suggested variation of the
three sample recordings would be: (a) Classical Composition, (b)
Semi.Classical, (c)Popular.
'As suggested by the Court's action in Schuberth v. Shaw cited
in footnote 33, supra.
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follow the outline suggested above for making the necessary
amendments to our copyright laws in order to bring them up to
date with respect to musicians.
In the absence of broader legislation upon the subject the
courts of equity should protect the property rights of musicians
upon the principles of unfair'competition. The road to protection by the courts has been surveyed by the Waring case4 0 and
with a direct holding upon the doctrine as announced there, the
road to full protection is open, even in the absence of legislation.
Qualified and recognized composers and artists should be
fully protected in th.eir artistic originations. Mere aspirants
should be forced to use their own efforts to gain recognition.

Supra n. 15.

L. J.-7
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